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Philippa Foot

An Oxford/UCLA philosopher (1920-2010) developed a distinctive theory of non-utilitarian naturalistic ethics in which the virtues play a central role.

Hand Clasping​

Foot says that the noncognitivist views (emotivism and prescriptivism) depend on two assumptions:

  • what counts as evidence for an evaluative conclusion in no way depends on what anyone else counts as evidence.
  • anyone can refuse to draw an evaluative conclusion in the face of what others regard as definitive evidence.

These assumptions lead to the conclusion that evaluative assumptions are entirely unconnected to factual judgements. In other words: what is good has nothing to do with the fact of the matter.

To argue against the first assumption: imagine Joe has been awarded the prize for best pumpkin, and feels pride in this accomplishment, but in fact it turns out that it was not his pumpkin. We could no longer say he felt pride. No matter his mental state, the facts of the matter no longer support feeling the emotion of pride.

It similarly would not be possible to feel proud of walking a single step, except that there is some special condition that made such walking impossible before, such as a severe injury.

“even feelings are logically vulnerable to facts”

This analogy extends to feeling that something is "good". Foot asks us to consider someone who deems it good to always clasp one’s hands three times in an hour. This person might claim it is a duty to so clasp one’s hands, praise others for doing it and so on. Are these moral judgments? Without some special reason for clasping hands, it can not be considered to be good.

To argue against the second assumption: If an action can be shown to be in our interests, we have reason to do it, and so we can say we ought to do it; it would be irrationally bad to not do it. Cultivating virtues is in our interest, and therefor regardless of our present desires, it is good to cultivate virtues.

Consider an injury that prevents the use of some significant part of the body. We have reason to avoid this. No rational person seeks an injury for itself, and every rational person avoids injury for itself. General facts concerning human beings support the idea that it is necessary for rational people to want their limbs intact; everyone should avoid such injury. If there was some reason that such an injury benefitted us, then would be good, and there is no reason we should avoid it.

She argues that the virtues can be taken to be as essential to the fulfillment of our desires as are our limbs.

Main References​

  1. "Moral Beliefs" (1958–59) — Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59(1): 83–104 Her breakthrough. Attacks the fact/value gap by arguing that terms like "injury," "danger," and "harm" have built-in evaluative content that isn't up for grabs — you can't just decide that clasping your hands three times an hour is "good." This is the single most relevant paper to §1 of the critique.

  2. "Moral Arguments" (1958) — Mind 67(268): 502–513 Argues against Hare that moral argument isn't endlessly open — there are limits on what can count as a reason for a moral conclusion.

  3. "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" (1972) — The Philosophical Review 81(3): 305–316 Her most-cited article. Denies Kant's categorical imperative: moral reasons bind only those who already care about the ends morality serves. Read this one carefully — see the note below.

  4. "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect" (1967) — Oxford Review 5: 5–15 The paper that invented the trolley problem (as a footnote to a larger argument about doing vs. allowing).

  5. "Virtues and Vices" (1978) — title essay of the collection The programmatic statement of modern virtue ethics: virtues as correctives to characteristic human temptations.

  6. "Euthanasia" (1977) — Philosophy and Public Affairs 6(2): 85–112 Applies the killing/letting-die distinction and introduces her account of "life that is a good."

  7. "Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma" (1983) — The Journal of Philosophy 80(7): 379–398 On whether genuine moral conflicts refute realism. Directly relevant to your book's chapter on rules conflicting.

  8. "Utilitarianism and the Virtues" (1985) — Mind 94(374): 196–209 Her frontal assault on consequentialism — argues the notion of "the best state of affairs," judged from no particular point of view, is incoherent. This is the paper that most directly threatens the book's Chapter 3 assumption at what-is-good.md:12.

  9. "Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?" (1995) — Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15(1): 1–14 Exactly the question your book is asking, from the strongest naturalist realist of the era. Should be cited.

  10. "Rationality and Goodness" (2004) — in Modern Moral Philosophy, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 54: 1–14 Her late statement: practical rationality and moral goodness are not separable. Her last major paper.

Two more worth having

  • "Goodness and Choice" (1961) — Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35(1): 45–80
  • "Morality, Action, and Outcome" (1985) — in Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie, 23–38